Behavioral Detection by the TSA SPOT Program By,

BehavioralDetection by the TSA SPOT Program

By,

UnitTitle

Abstract

Thisstudy sought to determine whether the TSA should limit funding forthe SPOT program. The research question was informed by the increasedcontroversy concerning the efficacy and scientific justification ofthe SPOT program as a mechanism of behavior detection. The papercollected secondary information relating to respondents comprisingpassengers, behavior detection officers (BDOs), security experts andairport administrators. The outcomes of the study show that the SPOTprogram is grossly ineffective in behavior detection since thephysical characteristics it relies on to discern criminals andsuspicious individuals from innocent passengers can identify innocentpassengers who may express similar characteristics. Moreover, mostcriminals do not manifest their internal thought processes in amanner that can be observed physically. The study also reveals thatthe TSA is managerially incompetent in managing the funds allocatedto it and attending to the affairs of the BDOs that could make theprogram effective. The study, therefore, concludes that there is aneed to limit funding for TSA’s SPOT program to enable efficientuse of already available resources. Nonetheless, it is important forTSA to provide an empirical justification or scientific basis of theSPOT program as a prerequisite for additional funding.

KeyWords: TransportSafety Authority, Behavioral Detection Officers, behavior, criminal,funding, efficiency

Contents

CHAPTER 1 1

Introduction 1

Background to the Topic 2

Significance of the Study 4

Research Questions 5

Research Objectives 7

Research Synopsis 7

CHAPTER TWO 8

Literature Review 8

Theoretical Literature Review 8

The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) and Theory of Reasoned Action 8

Psychosocial Traits and Criminality Theory 10

The Labeling Theory 11

The Lifestyle Theory of Criminology 13

Empirical Literature Review 14

Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) Program by TSA 17

CHAPTER THREE 21

Methodology 21

Time Frame 21

Research Design 21

Collection of Data and Information 22

Sources of Information 23

Inclusion Criteria 23

The United States House of Representatives 25

Government Accountability Office 25

Department of Homeland Security 26

CHAPTER FOUR 26

Findings 26

4.1 Values of TSA SPOT Programs 26

4.2 The United States House of Representatives 30

4.3 Comparison of TSA SPOT Programs in the United States and Israel 31

General Responses on Efficacy of TSA’s SPOT Program 33

Interviews with BDOs, Administrators and Security Experts 37

4.2.1. Behavioral Detection Officers (BDO’s) 37

4.2.2. Airport Administrators and Security Experts 38

CHAPTER FIVE 39

Conclusion and Recommendations 39

REFERENCES 46

APPENDIX 52

CHAPTER 1Introduction

Inthe past few years, stakeholders in the US Department of HomelandSecurity and researchers have questioned the efficacy of thenon-verbal behavior detection techniques employed by TransportSecurity Administration (TSA). The Screening of Passengers byObservation Techniques (SPOT) involves the use of Behavior DetectionOfficers (BDOs) to identify “suspicious” passengers foradditional screening based on certain observed characteristics. Inthe past few years, the few cases of attempted terrorism even withthe use of SPOT methods have led stakeholders to question theefficiency of such methods and especially due to the outrageousfunding allocated to TSA for implementation of the program. Moreover,there are concerns that the BDOs may use the program maliciously tohead hunt for specific individuals.

Traditionally,airport safety and security was focused on identifying the threatitem rather than the potential terrorist, as is the case with thecognitive load approaches used today to detect deception and elementsof criminality (Frank et al., 2009, p. 147Blandón-Gitlin, 2014, p. 441-444).However,terrorists changed their style of attack and stopped using items asinstruments of terrorism. This evolution of terrorism attack is whatculminated in the SPOT program as a sophisticated mechanism completewith a framework for discerning the potential terrorists during thesecurity screening at the airport. The SPOT technique was anchored inthe belief that potential terrorists often display certain suspiciousbut identifiable behaviors at the airport. However, there has been anincreased scrutiny on the sustainability and efficiency of theprogram especially due to the finding that existing empiricalevidence does not provide any evidence to the effect that behavioralindicators can be relied upon in identifying aviation securitythreats (GAO, 2013, p. 15).

Thisstudy seeks to undertake an extensive review of the empiricalliterature and employ quantitative techniques to determine if theSPOT techniques are effective therefore, if the outrageous fundingby TSA for the non-verbal behavior detection is justified.

Backgroundto the Topic

TheScreening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) is aculmination of the persistent evolution of criminal activities at theairports that necessitated for a more sophisticated and effectivescreening for potential terrorists by TSA officers. Traditionally,screening for potential criminals only focused on identifying theitems that could be used by terrorists without due regard to any“strange” behaviors that may be exhibited by such individuals.However, following the September 11 attacks, where terrorists used anairplane rather than an item to carry out their attacks, airportsecurity screening began focusing on the behavioral activities ofindividuals during airport screening as much as they did thescreening for any weapons that could be used by the terrorists. TheTSA responded by devising a screening technique based on behavioralscience.

InOctober 2003, the airport safety authority conducted a pilot programof the SPOT techniques in a number of airports in the U.S. five yearslater, TSA created several positions in the disguise of behavioraldetection officers (BDOs), ostensibly signifying the success of theprogram in the few airports in which it had been implemented.Moreover, the BDOs were to identify suspicious individuals at theairports using behavioral indicators including fear, deception andstress (GPO, 2011, p. 3).The BDOs were to undertake this task using achecklist that contained corresponding values complete withbehavioral parameter thresholds. The BDOs were to use the outlinedparameters to evaluate passengers while on the queue awaitingsecurity screening and any individuals who exhibited behaviors thatsurpassed the set limits were referred for intensive securityscreening. The SPOT program was sequential and systematic in thesense that the identified passengers who exhibited behavioralvariables surpassing the thresholds of the secondary screening werereferred further to law enforcement officers (Blandón-Gitlinet al., 2014, p. 441-444).

Itis important to note at this point of the paper that the initialintention of the SPOT program was to identify the potentialterrorists in the aviation sector. Over time, the scope of theprogram has been broadened to include the detection of specificbehaviors indicative of criminal activity (GPO, 2011, p. 3). Thisexpansion of the program’s scope has drawn a lot of criticism assome pundits point out that the move shows the inefficiency andfailure of the program to achieve the primal objectives for which itwas established. The argument is that TSA expanded the objectives ofthe program to include criminal activities as a way of retaining theprogram’s credibility since it has a higher probability ofoccurrence (Meyer, 2010, p. 289-339). However, the fact that theexpanded program required more staff and capital when the relevanceof the program was questionable is what informs the endeavor of thisstudy.

Moreaptly, the expansion of the program in 2012 saw the TSA employ over3000 BDOs in 161 airports at a cost of about $200 million annually.Moreover, a budgetary proposal for the program in five years(2012-2017) is estimated to cost $1.2 billion, a program that willsee the TSA recruit about 175 more BDOs (GPO, 2011, p. 16). The mostsignificant setback to the program was in May 2011 when theGovernment Accountability Office (GAO) noted several problems withthe program even concluding that the program was deployed without anyscientific validation (GAO, 2013, n.p).Essentially, the SPOT programcame to be conceived by many as an expensive program that had beenimplemented without any form of empirical validation. In the recentyears, SPOT has become the first behavioral science program to besubjected to evaluation and empirical outcomes have differed in theirfindings, which has necessitated increased and more rigorous researchin the use of behavioral science in criminal behavior detection.Essentially, the inquiry into the efficacy of the SPOT program hasbeen necessitated by the perceived inefficiency of the program, thequestioning of the empirical mechanisms through which the TSA did itsfeasibility study and the inconclusiveness in the empiricalliterature concerning the applicability of behavioral science incriminal detection.

Moreover,the program requires massive resources since the training and hiringof BDO’s and compensation-related charges are very high. Therefore,tracing the origin of the program and its evolution from when it wasfirst piloted in 2003 to date reveals a combination of factors thatneed an extensive empirical study especially to ascertain if theoutrageous funding of the program is necessary, and thus the researchquestion of this paper.

Significanceof the Study

Designedto evaluate the economic sustainability of SPOT as a criminaldetection mechanism, this study seeks to provide invaluable insightsinto the most appropriate action that should be taken by theDepartment of Homeland Security (DHS) concerning the continued use ofthe program. Moreover, by reviewing a variety of empirical studiesand GAO reports, this paper seeks to evaluate the costs related toSPOT and if such costs can be minimized without compromising airportsecurity. This study will particularly be important especially giventhat in 2013, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted areview of over 400 studies on behavioral science and detection ofcriminals and provided outcomes that questioned the use of BDOs todetect behaviors suggestive of criminals. In the report, GAOestablished that on average, a BDO officer can only tell if anindividual is lying with a 54% probability (GAO, 2013, n.p). In thisrespect, the study that came after a similar one by GAO in 2010recommended that the funding for SPOT be suspended until someempirical evidence is provided showing that BDOs can indeed ascertainif an individual is lying with a convincing probability. Moreover, ithas been noted that a review of the SPOT data has revealed that ameager 1% of the 30, 000 individuals referred for secondary screeningannually are found guilty and guilty for drug possession and othercrimes other than terrorism (Dickerson, 2015, n.p).

Thisstudy is expected to provide useful information that can be employedto evaluate the sustainability of the SPOT program by reviewing someof the most recent empirical studies linking behavioral science andcriminal detection mechanisms. This is particularly important sinceTSA itself has limited information to evaluate the effectiveness ofthe SPOT program, such as data used to measure high-risk passengeroutcomes (GAO, 2013, p. 30).The study also seeks to investigate thespending on SPOT by TSA to establish if such spending is necessary inlight of the perceived benefits of the program. For instance, thereare studies that have confirmed that the TSA spends $200 millionannually on SPOT but also that the consequent benefits of thisspending are minimal if not totally absent (Edwards, 2014, n.p).Therefore, the outcomes of this study will be crucial in providinginformation on the economic sustainability of the SPOT program basedon the identified mechanisms through which the program works and theassociated efficiency of the program.

ResearchQuestions

Thisstudy seeks to address the following research questions:

1. How effective is the passenger screening through the use of nonverbal behaviors?

2. Is it advisable that the TSA limit funding for behavior detection?

3. Is there any alternative and effective mechanism for criminal detection at airports?

ResearchObjectives

Bythe end of the study, this paper should be able to address thefollowing objectives:

1. To assess the efficacy of passenger screening using non-verbal behaviors

2. To determine if the TSA should limit funding for the SPOT program

3. To provide recommendations on a possible (viable) mechanism of criminal detection at airports

ResearchSynopsis

Giventhe controversy that TSA’s SPOT program has drawn in the past fewyears, this study seeks to ascertain if the TSA should reduce thespending on its SPOT program by evaluating the efficiency of theprogram and its perceived costs against the benefits. The rest of thepaper is organized as follows.

1. Literature Review: This is the second part of the paper that provides a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the efficacy of using behavioral science in detecting criminals. Studies that have assessed the efficiency of the SPOT program in particular, including GAO and TSA reports will be very critical to this part. The review of the literature yields the study hypotheses.

2. Methodology: This part of the study presents the approaches that will be used to achieve the study objectives. It provides a description of the instruments used in data collection and analysis.

3. Results: This part presents the study outcomes and a brief discussion of such outcomes relating them to theory and empirical outcomes of previous studies.

4. Conclusion: The final part of the report that presents the general outcomes of the study and provides recommendations based on the outcomes discussed in the preceding section of the report.

CHAPTER TWOLiteratureReview

Thissection of the report provides a review of both theoretical andempirical literature on the efficacy of using non-verbal behaviordetection techniques in identifying criminals. This part of thereport is divided into two sections: Theoretical Literature Reviewand Empirical Literature Review.

TheoreticalLiterature Review

Humanaction is a structured process that is a culmination of internalthoughts and can be predicted using certain approaches in what isreferred to as the identity thesis (Goldman, 2015, p. 2). Thissection analyzes some of the theories of identifying human behaviorsdiscussing their significance to the endeavor of this paper.

TheTheory of Planned Behavior (TPB) and Theory of Reasoned Action

IcekAjzen proposed the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) in 1985 as animprovement to the predictive power of the theory of reasoned actionsince the TPB takes into account the perceived behavioral control inpredicting human actions. This theory proposes that an individual’sattitude towards a behavior, perceived behavioral structures andsubjective norms determine an individual’s behavioral intentionsand by extension, behaviors (Ajzen, 2011, p. 438 Cornally, 2014, p.69 Infinedo, 2012, p. 83-95). In this theory, human action isdetermined by the individual’s evaluation of the possibleconsequences of the planned action together with the subjective normsthat comprise the social pressures exerted on an individual as aresult of the expectations of moral action from the society (Morriset al., 2012, p. 5). This theory is relevant to the endeavor of thispaper because of its wide application in predicting behavior andretrospective analysis of individual behavior (Taylor et al., 2006,p. 1-215). The figure below provides a conceptual framework of theTheory of Planned Behavior.

Figure1.0:Theory of Planned Behavior

Source:Munroe et al. (2007), Figure 7

Figure1.0 shows the constructs that structure behavioral intention (wherephysical signs are likely to manifest) before a certain action(behavior) is committed. TPB proposes that an individual willmanifest certain discernible behaviors prior to performing a certainaction that is due to the behavioral intention and behavior.Behavioral intention is a key concept of this theory that refers toan individual’s readiness to undertake a certain action. As forbehavior, Ajzen posited that the behaviors exhibited by individualsprior to committing certain actions depend on the compatibility ofperceptions and intentions and any diversion manifests in physicallyobservable signs (Ajzen, 2011, p. 438-440). According to Morris etal. (2012), the Theory of Planned Behavior and the Theory of Reasonedaction can be used to predict individual behavior to a probability ofbetween 20 and 30% (p. 5). This theory is significant to the endeavorof this paper because it proposes that individual behavior can bepredicted due to the behavioral intention which can cause animbalance in the cognitive processes of human beings as a result ofthe diversion of the planned behavior from the social (subjective)norms. The form of “internal discomfort” that may be occasionedby failure to reconcile the planned action with the societal normsmay cause individuals to behave abnormally therefore, exhibitcertain actions that may be detected by BDOs in the SPOT program.

PsychosocialTraits and Criminality Theory

Thisis an umbrella theory proposing a positive and significantcorrelation between certain personality traits and crime. In thisframework, it is proposed that there are certain specific personalitytraits (characteristics) that are often manifested by criminals `muchas it remains controversial whether these characteristics arenaturally present in criminals (Lyman &amp Potter, 2007, p. 63).This theory is significant to the objectives of the current studysince it focuses on individual’s personality traits, intelligenceand temperament (Walsh, 2006, p. 170), all of which can be observedusing certain specific abnormal (or suspicious) behaviors as is thecase with the SPOT program. Moreover, this theory proposes thatcriminal activities can be detected by observing certain elements ofpersonality, intelligence or temperament that are typical ofcriminals. This is especially possible since the theory outlines thelikely constructs of individuals that may be observable in predictingcriminal activities such as mood (sad/ happy), activity level, effect(warm/ cold), sociability and reactivity (excitable/ calm) (Walsh,2006, p. 174). The theory proposes that identifying psychopaths(potential criminals) requires one to look for callous and hedonisticindividuals. Moreover, such individuals often exhibit emotionalimmaturity, a relentless effort to justify their mistakes and displaya lack of sound judgment (Lyman &amp Potter, 2007, p. 63).Essentially, this theory proposes that criminal activities can bepredicted by checking out for certain specific actions indicative ofcriminal minds. Using this theory to discern criminals from innocentpersons is a situation that calls for a delicate balance betweenisolating the characteristics typical of criminals andinstantaneously provoked traits. The major weakness of this theory isthat it assumes that criminals cannot divert from the physicallyobservable traits inherent in the nature of their personalities.

TheLabeling Theory

Thistheory of criminology that was very prominent in the 1960s.Itproposes that the probability of individuals to commit a crime isdetermined by the self-identity attached to them by the society. Inthis framework, deviance (read criminal activities) depends on thetendency of the majority in a society to negatively label theminority as not conforming to the standard norms of the society. Moreaptly, specific individuals or groups of individuals labelednegatively usually develop some kind of a stigma that alters anindividual’s social identity and self-concept. With respect to theendeavor of this paper, this theory is significant because itadvances that when certain groups in a society are labeled ascriminals, they are likely to commit a crime as a form of aself-fulfilling prophecy. Intuitively, the labeling theory prescribesthat criminal activities in the society can be prevented if thesociety avoids social shaming and negative stereotypes directed atother groups in the society. This mechanism of crime prevention asprescribed by the theory requires any form of moral indignationmanifest in the society to be replaced by the tolerance of eachother. According to the labeling theory, individuals who associate acertain undesirable label with some sections of the society are veryunlikely to change their perceptions of such individuals (Crossman,2015, n.p). Similarly, the “labeled” individuals also find theirvictim status irreversible (Kennedy, 2002, p. 237). The essence ofthis statement in the current report is to provide an explanation(though partial) of the reported cases of bias towards Muslimpassengers who most behavior detection officers (BDOs) have alwaysassociated with terrorist activities. Moreover, given that a meager1% of the 30, 000 individuals referred for secondary screening inSPOT annually are found guilty and guilty for drug possession andother crimes other than terrorism (Dickerson, 2015, n.p), thepossible explanation for the small percentage of criminals (out ofthe passengers referred for secondary screening) could be due to thisbias. The logical application of the labeling theory of criminologyto the US airports by the TSA officers would imply screening forpassengers along stereotypes of criminology but at the same timetaking into account the fact that most stereotypes have no scientific(empirical) basis. Nonetheless, since the theory proposes that the“label” attached to a particular group (or individual) to asociety determines their actions, the theory’s implication fornon-verbal behavior detection techniques employed in the SPOT programis clear. Stereotyped individuals (potential criminals), whensubjected to any form of security screening, will always struggle tomaintain consistency in their feelings of self-worth. It is in thisstruggle to balance between conformity and self-identity as imposedby the society that is likely to manifest in certain “suspicious”behaviors that may be picked up by BDOs. It is important to note atthis point, however, that such behaviors may or may not be apredictor of criminal activities. This theory is strong for itscomprehensiveness concerning the likely causes of individuals tocommit a crime and for its provisions on how the society can preventcriminal activities. The theory, by identifying the role ofstereotypes in causing criminal activities therefore, a factorconsidered by criminal detection officers provides insight into thefew cases of criminals identified from large samples referred forsecondary screening.

TheLifestyle Theory of Criminology

GlenWalters, a renowned American psychologist proposed this theory ofvictimology. The theory proposes that criminal behavior is astructured pattern of life characterized by discernible constructs ofirresponsibility, impulsiveness, negative interpersonal relationshipsand impulsiveness (Walsh, 2006, p. 184-185).According to GlenWalters, criminal activity is a function of the interaction betweenpersonality traits of criminals and the environmental factors. Thistheory focuses more on the underlying patterns of criminal thinkingrather than how such patterns come to be created. The theory can beconceived in light of its three fundamental tenets of explainingcriminal activities namely choice,conditionsand cognition(Walters, 1994, p. 159-182). By choice,Walters implies that criminal activities begin when criminals makethe decision to commit crime, decisions that are influenced byexperience and environmental forces. The conditionsunder which criminals make decisions are mostly based on the level ofIQ and impulsiveness. The third construct, cognition, implies theadaptive techniques that individuals acquire because of theenvironmental circumstances that confronted them in the precedingstage of crime commission. This theory is very significant to theobjectives of this study since the theory proposes that in theidentification of criminals, there are certain attributes that shouldbe screened for in passengers. The behaviors include “rulebreaking, interpersonal intrusiveness (intruding into the lives ofothers when not wanted), self-indulgence and irresponsibility”(Walsh, 2006, p. 185). In essence, the lifestyle theory ofcriminology prescribes that non-verbal behavior detection can beemployed to discern criminals at public spaces.

EmpiricalLiterature Review

Researchershave conducted several empirical studies concerning the efficacy ofusing behavioral science techniques in identifying criminals.Additionally, there are specific studies that have been conducted toassess particularly the efficacy of the SPOT program and TSA spendingon the program since its implementation in US airports by theDepartment of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003. According to Edwards(2014), TSA spends an outrageous $200 million annually on the SPOTprogram despite the inconclusiveness of studies examining theefficacy of the program in identifying terrorists. The concernsaround the use of the program by TSA have majorly been shaped by thefindings of empirical studies on the efficacy of using behavioralscience in identifying terrorists. Empirical studies have establishedthat in general, the psychology of terrorism mostly comprises theoryand opinions rather than empirical evidence making it difficult toimplement terrorist identification strategies that are objective andreliable (DeAngelis, 2009, n.p). Better still, there are studies thatare skeptical about the use of behavioral techniques as well as othermechanisms of identifying terrorism. Such studies have delved intoexamining what we in common parlances conceive as “terroristpersonality” and interesting outcomes have been obtained. Accordingto Borum (2004), using behavioral science or other mechanisms ofidentifying criminals is inherently ineffective because “there isno terrorist personality” and that there is neither an accurateprofile that can denote a terrorist (Borum, 2004, p. 3). According toGPO (2011), there is no scientific consensus as to whether behaviordetection principles are appropriate for use in counterterrorismespecially since there has never been a behavioral detectionmechanism that have ever been validated (p. 4). However, there arestudies that have also noted the inconclusive nature of research onthe behavioral science-terrorism nexus but as much registered theneed for an integrative approach. For instance, it some of theearliest studies in the discipline proposed that the efforts toidentify criminals should be influenced by both scientific knowledge,empathy and other broad concerns (Schmideberg, 1947, p. 476).Thepropositions of these studies seem to recognize that just like anyaspect of human beings crime (terrorism) is an abstract andsubjective construct of individuals for which there can never be auniversal approach to identify.

Behavioralscience has however identified certain specific actions resultingfrom different emotional and psychological states that are associatedwith constructs of crime such as violent intent and deception (Daviset al., 2013, p. 23). However, much as literature materials haveidentified such behaviors as predictors of criminal activity thereare studies that question the probability with which such actions canbe manifested by potential terrorists. There are researchers whocontend that criminals are also aware that their psychological andemotional states are likely to manifest physically in theirnon-verbal cues and will, therefore, act in a manner to conceal suchsigns (Kocsis, 2009, p. 97). The literature on crime behavioralpsychology laid a greater emphasis on the role of internal andexternal conditions within which criminals find themselves. Moststudies seem to propose that the environment (condition) is the mostsignificant factor that determines whether the internal states of acriminal will manifest physically therefore, enable the detection ofsuch criminals. To this extent, two broad factors have been found tobe precisely crucial in enabling detection of criminals usingnon-verbal techniques namely, an individual’s self-control (extentof vulnerability to conditional temptations) and crime opportunity(Longshore et al., 1996, p. 209).However, such studies have oftenbeen refuted based on the stability of the identified constructs ashuman constructs. Additionally, there is the ever-persistent concernof whether such characteristics will manifest in a similar manner toall criminals.

Inmost empirical literature materials, detection of criminals is mostlymanifested by deception especially when certain individuals arereferred for secondary screening. Studies have investigated thepossibility that criminals can experience effective processes andstill conceal them (GPO, 2011, p. 75). Empirical studies have furtherinvestigated the reliability and validity of micro-expressions bysuspected criminals observing that innocent individuals can manifestsome of the outlined characteristics of “typical criminals.” Themost common finding of most empirical studies is to the effect thatthere is no common personality profile that fits all terrorists, mostof who appear to be normal and that terrorists are sane rather thaninsane people (Borum, 2007, p. 3). The use of technology as asupplement to the effort of detecting criminals at airports has alsobeen studied. Such studies have proposed the use of technologies suchas electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)to enable the detection of changes in brain processes associated withfeelings, thoughts and behaviors of individuals (GPO, 2011, p. 7).The approaches that entail the use of technology can also be employedin the detection of criminals through investigations since lying isconsidered to be more difficult than telling the truth and as suchresults in a more cognitive load that manifests in individuals in theform of nervousness (Kocsis, 2009, p. 97). Reviewing most empiricalstudies show that criminals usually experience certain specificinternal process than mostly result due to the incompatibility of thesubjective norms and their behavioral intention. A further analysisof such literature, however, fails to provide the exact mechanismsthrough which such internal “discomfort” results in the behaviorsthat can be physically observed. Additionally, literature shows thateven if such internal processes and changes in brain functioning ofcriminals were to manifest physically as hypothesized, they would notmanifest uniformly and in the same degree in all criminals thusmaking the detection of criminals using non-verbal techniques asophisticated procedure that calls for an integrative mechanism basedon both science and subjective approaches.

Screeningof Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) Program by TSA

TheSPOT program has attracted a lot of research attention as anon-verbal behavior detection technique with some empirical studiesportraying it as grossly inefficient. Moreover, correlational studieshave been conducted seeking to assess if there is any relationshipbetween the funding for the program and its perceived benefits. Anempirical report of 400 surveys by the Government AccountabilityOffice (GAO) noted several problems with the program even concludingthat the program was deployed without any scientific validation (GAO,2013, n.p). The TSA uses the SPOT program alongside other normalscreening techniques to screen for “high risk” individuals as anextra security measure in U.S airports (Mock, 2009, p. 216). Casestudies have also been undertaken to evaluate the efficacy of SPOTprogram and the results have been presented to various policy centersand legislative bodies like the GPO report presented to the Congresssubcommittee on investigations and oversight on April 6, 2011.Thereport showed that TSA’s SPOT program has clear opportunity coststhat had to be taken into account. For instance, it was found thatfor every single BDO employed, there is a security staff not lookingat the x-ray of baggage, a security analyst not employed and probablyno air marshal in the sky. Moreover, the report showed that theprogram’s implementation had raised serious security and privacyconcerns other than the foundation of the science behind it (GPO,2011, p. 18). Another phenomenal report released by the GovernmentAccountability Office (GAO) in May 2010 also showed grossincompetence at TSA especially with regards to the implementation ofthe SPOT program. The report indicated that TSA was facing manychallenges in implementing the non-verbal behavior identificationprogram. Failing to use the resources at its disposal to utilizeinformation collected from passengers by BDOs was found to be onegreat undoing of the TSA. The report showed that the TransportationSystem Operations Center of TSA had the capacity to investigate thethreats to the aviation sector but did not utilize the intelligenceand law enforcement databases for necessary information to initiatethe investigations. Additionally, it was found that the traininggiven to the BDOs was not adequate and that there were some BDOs wholacked fundamental skills required to input information on suspiciouscriminals into TSA databases for security analysis (GAO, 2010, p.1).Additionally, empirical research also shows that the TSA shouldemploy cognitive task analysis to structure a high levelorganizational cognitive task assessment to understand the BDOsprofessional life cycles and make them more competent (Kittinger &ampBender, 2015, n.p).

In2011, the Government Accountability Office conducted a similar surveyto that of the previous year to evaluate the competencies of TSA’sSPOT program. The 2011 report provided much more positive results andan overall expansion of the program. By 2011, TSA had employed BDO’sin 161 airports across the United States in a fiscal year when theDHS funded the SPOT project at a cost of about $211.9 million andrequested a further $232 million for the same program to buildcapacity by sustaining 3,350 behavior detection officers (GAO, 2011,p. 1). Essentially, the SPOT program looked to be picking up withmore BDOs being employed utilization of information collected fromsuspicious passengers and increased use of strategically positionedcameras in the TSA controlled airports. However, despite the notableprogress, the program required more funds, yet TSA had not providedthe scientific validation for its SPOT program as requested by GAO in2010. The 2011 report can be conceived as an evaluation report thatportrayed a controversial program on the rise despite the necessityfor its validation. What lacked grossly in the SPOT program by TSAwas the drive behind the program’s expansion across the UnitedStates. Moreover, the TSA had posited that the initiative was basedon scientific knowledge at the time of the program’s incubation.TSA also stated that at the time, there was an urgent need for amechanism that would enable security officers to cope with theevolving nature of terrorism in which terrorists resorted to takingover the airplane itself rather than using items as was the casebefore. This new style of terrorism was best evident in the September11 attack.

In2013, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released yet anotherinsightful report after evaluating the SPOT program. The key outcomeof the report that led to its recommendation to DHS to cut fundingfor the SPOT program was that the existing empirical evidence did notprovide adequate support to the extent that behavioral indicators canbe relied upon to detect aviation security threats, as is the case inthe SPOT program (GAO, 2013, p. 15). The report also revealed thatTSA lacked adequate information to assess the efficacy of itsbehavior detection activities since the information provided in theprevious year were inconclusive owing to some methodologicalweaknesses (p. 30).

TheGAO report concluded that from 2007, the SPOT program had madesignificant progress noting that the total funding for the programbetween 2007 and 2013 was approximately $900 million. However,despite the outrageous spending on the project over the five-yearperiod, GAO noted the TSA was yet to demonstrate that the adoptedbehavioral indicators could be used reliably to detect high-riskpassengers. The 2013 report is particularly significant to this papersince it investigated the sustainability of the SPOT programexpressing concerns that the mechanisms adopted by TSA to providescientific backing for the SPOT program was an undertaking thatrequired massive resources as well (p. 47).The implications of such afinding for the program sustainability cannot be mistaken.

First,the program has already been funded to the tune of about $900 millionfor five years despite the fact that it was not founded on anyscientific facts thereby making it a very risky and anuncollateralized venture. Better still, in order to collect thenecessary information to provide a scientific validation, the programrequires yet more resources making it a very expensive venture sinceadditional capital is required to maintain the BDOs as well as sunkcosts in the disguise of research and validation expenses. It isimportant to note at this point that pursuing scientific validationfor an ongoing project is bound to be a very expensive andchallenging venture especially if the outcomes of such a validationsurvey do not favor the project. The report made a conclusion to theeffect that since the SPOT program had been in operation for aboutten years (since 2003) and had not provided any scientific validationindicating that the behavioral traits relied upon by the programcould be used to detect terrorists with a reasonable probability. Itwas, therefore, necessary for the DHS to reduce funding for theprogram (GAO, 2013, p. 47).This recommendation is reaffirmed by GAO’spolicy concerning defense and advanced research projects, whichrequire that technical projects be anchored on rigorous research inorder to achieve clearly defined technical goals (GAO, 2015, n.p).

Insummary, a review of theoretical and empirical literature bothsupport the premise that criminal activities are a form of deviancefrom the subjective norms of the society and that it is this deviancethat structures an internal discomfort in criminals that can manifestin certain observable behaviors. Environmental factors have beenfound to play a key role in this processes much as is the case withcognitive process. The empirical surveys of the efficacy of the SPOTprogram by TSA reveal that the program has achieved considerablesuccess over the past 12 years that it has been in operation onlythat the costs of the program by far supersede its perceivedbenefits.

CHAPTER THREEMethodology

Thispart of the report provides the techniques and mechanisms that wereused to obtain and analyze information pertaining to whether the TSAshould limit funding for the SPOT program. Given that the ultimateobjective of this paper is to evaluate the economic sustainabilityand relevance of the SPOT program, this section of the report willdescribe all the activities and mechanisms that were used to achievethis objective. This study utilized secondary data from varioussources.

TimeFrame

Accordingto Polit and Beck (2004), the time frame was defined as how far backthe researcher can extend their search for the relevant informationto be utilized in the literature review section. Since the currentbehavioral detection techniques were caused by the terrorism acts onSeptember 11, 2001, the research will use sources that were publishedbetween 2001 and 2015. The sources to be used in the paper should befrom 2001 when the terrorist attack occurred in the United States.This will provide a sufficient timeline to analyze the progress thathas been since the initiation of the program to improve the securityof the aviation industry in the United States.

ResearchDesign

Thisstudy used the quantitative techniques to ascertain whether it isjustified for TSA to continue funding the TSA program involves ananalysis of the figures. The selection of this method in the studywas informed by the fact that qualitative research designs areadvantageous in studies that include the acquisition of quantitativeinformation because it can provide stronger evidence for the studyconclusion by facilitating the corroboration of findings andconvergence, thus triangulation (SAE, 2015, n.p). The use ofquantitative research designs is also effective in carrying outresearch because it supplements the repertoire of quantitativeresearchers thereby enabling them to achieve critical legitimatinggoals like greater transferability (De Lisle, 2011, p. 113). Theessence of the quantitative research design in this study is toenable the analysis of the SPOT program budget and the TSA fundingallocated to the program against its effectiveness as anon-behavioral detection mechanism.

Collectionof Data and Information

Thestudy conducted a systematic research review (SRR) to trace theprogress of the SPOT program and changes in funding as provided inspecific annual reports released by the Government AccountabilityOffice (GAO). To get a general picture of what we in common parlancesconceive as non-verbal behavior detection activities, the studyreviewed the program documents used by TSA and behavior detectionofficers (BDOs) as provided in the SPOT program operating proceduresas well as the SPOT strategic plan and performance metric plan.Moreover, given the nature of the study objectives, a chronologicalassessment of SPOT program strategic plan and performance metricswere undertaken to establish the degree to which TSA had implementedthe annual recommendations of the Government Accountability Office.To ensure the study was relevant and robust, it was necessary toobtain insights from established criminal detection andinvestigations unit concerning the efficacy of the non-verbalbehavior detection techniques of the SPOT program. Therefore, thestudy examined publications of the Federal Bureau of Investigations(FBI) Behavioral Science Unit to ascertain the degree to which theunit employs non-verbal behavior detection methods. For quantitativepurposes, the study obtained the figures pertaining to the FBI budgetand expenditure from the TSA website.

Sourcesof Information

Whenusing secondary data for analysis, it is necessary to identify thespecific information required. In this case, the study relates to thestudy of behavioral detection techniques used by the TSA SPOT programin the United States. Some of the factors that the study should takeinto consideration, in this case, include psychological andsociological techniques that have been developed by the agency toimprove the security of the air transport within the United States.By identifying the necessary information required, the researcherscan proceed to determine the sources of information that are credibleand as such, are to be included in the survey.

Thistopic discusses the activities and effectiveness of a governmentestablishment. Therefore, most of the data utilized in this caseinclude reports from the government accountability office, thelegislature section of the United States. Additionally, theinformation will be obtained from the federal agencies that have aresponsibility to ensure that security of the aviation industry iscatered for. The three primary sources of information used in thisstudy include the following:

InclusionCriteria

Itis important to note that the TSA SPOT program was initiated tosafeguard the aviation industry following the events that culminatedin the September 11 attacks. The new measures were put in place toensure that those gaining access to the airports in the United Statesposed no threat to the nation. It is in this regards that the countryprovided a framework of operations to ensure that the lapses thatculminated in the death of several Americans during the September 11terrorist attacks are not experienced again. The inclusion criteriain this case will focus on reliability and authenticity ofinformation. As one of the most important areas of concern for thegovernment towards the safety of its citizens, the choice of thesources of information should provide information that is consistentwith the role of the TSA SPOT program in the United States.

Thefirst group of sources will include government departments. These arearms of the government that are tasked with the responsibility ofensuring the safety of the American citizens. The Department ofHomeland Security reports falls into this category. The second typesof sources will involve governmental institutions tasked with playingan oversight role on government departments. GovernmentAccountability Office (GAO) reports will feature in this group ofsources. It provides n evaluation of the performance of the programso far and whether the mount spent has yielded the desirable results.Moreover, it focuses on the sustainability of the program.

Therole of legislature is also included in the study. Reports from theUnited States House of Representatives are used to highlight therecommendations that should be applied to the TSA SPOT program. Thelegislature approves the amount of finances allocated to suchprograms and it is therefore its mandate to evaluate the performanceand progress being made. The three forms of sources have beenselected for this paper to ensure reliability of information. Thegovernment departments and institutions in addition to thelegislature will provide high levels of consistency that is essentialto the research process.

Theabove three sources of information will be used in the study. For anydocument to be used, it must meet the conditions stated above. Thatis, it must be from government department involved with security andtransport sector, it must be a report from an institutions chargedwith playing an oversight role. Finally, the source must be from thelegislature with regards to conclusions made on the TSA SPOT program.

TheUnited States House of Representatives

TheUnited States House of Representatives conducted an evaluation of theSPOT program since its inception. The scrutiny was aimed at assessingthe performance of the program over a decade. Various issues werediscussed during the debate. This secondary source provides anextensive analysis of the changes that need to be integrated into theprogram to improve its efficiency in the long run. The assessment hadbeen necessitated by the apparent failure of the system to achieveits objectives. From the report prepared by the United States Houseof Representatives in 2011, the paper compares the projected outcomesof the project from its inception to the current achievements. Thedata is relevant to this study.

GovernmentAccountability Office

Thisis another secondary source that will be utilized in this study. GAOis a federal agency in charge of accounting for all the fundsallocated to various departments. It is relevant to this study sinceit provides certain information on the budgetary allocation for theSPOT program and a number of finances that have been spent onactivities such as training the officers on specific requirementsincluding behavioral detection techniques. The data obtained fromthis source is relevant to the study since it facilitates theanalysis of the efficacy of the program. Additionally, it discussesother areas of the program that would benefit from budgetaryallocations. Therefore, the source is important to the study becauseit compares the performance of various federal programs and financialallocation based on priority.

Departmentof Homeland Security

Thisis the section of the security system under which the SPOT programfalls under. It provides a chronological order of informationrelating to the specific variables in the sector. The reportsdeveloped by the Department of Homeland Security provide results onthe performance of the program. This can be in the form of Leoreferrals and arrests made as a consequence of the system.Additionally, it compares the changes that have been witnessed interms of safety since the introduction of the TSA SPOT programfollowing the events of September 11. Since the security of theUnited States goes beyond the aviation industry, the source conductsa comparison analysis between the number of arrests and securityattacks foiled by the various security apparatus that have beenimplemented in the past. By comparing the budgetary allocations andthe number of corresponding results obtained, this paper can be ableto make conclusions on the most effectiveness practices in achievingthe required objectives.

CHAPTER FOUR Findings4.1Values of TSA SPOT Programs

Therecent turn of events indicates a growing demand for the evaluationof the activities of TSA SPOT program in the United States. This canbe attributed to the levels of effectiveness that have been exhibitedby the current system. According to the reports, the TSA is yet toconduct a cost-benefit analysis which would go a long way inestablishing the value of the program in comparison to other existingaviation security measures (GAO, 2013). Moreover, such an analysiswould be substantial in identifying whether the program had made anysignificant improvements over the years.

Duringthe fiscal period between 2007 and 2009, the TSA is deemed to haveallocated the program approximately $383 million. The value indicatedan increase of TSA’s budget on the SPOT program from 1% to 5% (GAO,2013). However, based on the DHS appropriations for 2010 a value of$212 had been designated for the most appropriate value for the SPOTprogram. Therefore, conducting a cost-benefit analysis would havegone a long way in helping the relevant authorities to determinewhether the actual allocation of funds was appropriate and prudent(GAO, 2013).

Abudget and personnel growth in the SPOT program shows a substantialvariation between the actual total costs and total appropriated costsas well as the real BDO allocation and the total allocated BDO costs.The actual total costs incurred by the project in 2007 were $41million (GAO, 2013). In 2008, the figures increased to $141 millionand $198 million. The total appropriated costs as per the year 2010were $212 million. With regards to the BDO allocations, the actualnumber for 2007, 2008 and 2009 was 589, 2011 and 2860 respectively.The total appropriated BDO for 2010 was 2986 (GAO, 2013). Based onthe above analysis, it is hard to determine the appropriated amountsbefore the fiscal year 2010 since the funding was appropriated as alump sum. Additionally, funding for other screeners and the relevantconference reports failed to allocate specific amounts to the SPOTprograms (GAO, 2013).

Accordingto the Bureau of Transportation Statistics about passenger boardingat SPOT airports between May 2008 and August 2008, severalobservations have been made. The data indicates that during theperiod, approximately 2 billion passengers have boarded aircraft atthe SPOT airports. Moreover, there have been more than 152,000 (1%)SPOT secondary referrals during this period. An estimated 14,000(9.3%) passengers have also been referred to the LEOs with over 1,100(0.7%) SPOT related arrests stemming from this (GAO, 2013).

Variousreasons have been issued as the factors behind arrests from SPOTreferrals within this period. An estimated 427 passengers, anequivalent of 39% were arrested for being illegal aliens. This figurewas relatively higher in comparison to the 209 (19%) that had beenarrested for outstanding warrants (GAO, 2013). 166 arrests were madedue to the possession of fraudulent documents. This was an equivalentof 15% of the total arrests made within that period. 12% of thearrests (125) were made based on possession of suspected drugswhereas no reasons were given for the 16 arrests (1%). Undeclaredcurrencies also accounted for 1% of the arrests with zero arrestsbeing related to suspect documents. Some of the reasons that wereincluded under the “no reason” arrests included unruly behavior,theft, domestic violence, intoxication, and possession of prohibiteditems (GAO, 2013).

Thevalues SPOT referrals and arrests between October 2011 and September2012 indicate a significant decline in the number of offenses andindividuals arrested within the timeline. For 2012, the number ofpassengers that passed through the SPOT airports was established tobe 657,000,000. Of these, only 37,370 appeared on the SPOT ReferralRecords. This represented 0.057% of the passengers that went thoughsuch ports. Additionally, 2214 passengers received LEO referralswhile 199 arrests were made within this period. This is aninsignificant percentage of the passengers compared to data collected(GAO, 2013).

Withincreased attention being shifted towards the TSA SPOT program, aninstructor evaluation was commissioned to determine the performanceof the SPOT instructors. For the period between 2006 and 2008, atotal of 73 instructors were evaluated. Of those, 3 (4%) were gradedas unsatisfactory, 5 (7%) were listed as needing improvement, 36(49%) met the expectations, 22 (30%) reached the exceedingexpectations index, and 7 (10%) fell under the ‘no numeric given’section (GAO, 2013).

TheUnited States Government Accountability Office (GAO) has made variousconclusions regarding the TSA’s SPOT program and its effectivenessin ensuring aviation safety within the United States (GAO, 2013). Theprimary goal of the program has been identified as the identificationof individuals that may be deemed to cause threats to aviationsecurity. The program was initiated following the devastating attackon the United Sates on September 11, 2011. According to GAO, theprogram, which was allocated $5.2 billion for screening of passengersand their property in fiscal year 2009, provides an effective returnon investment on the taxpayers’ funds (GAO, 2013). The cost of theentire program for the next five years is projected at $1.2 billion.

Theaccountability agency has also issued various recommendations to beinitiated by the program in order to achieve its primary objectivesover the years. One such recommendation demands for a comprehensiverisk assessment that will include threat vulnerability. Additionally,there is need for cost-benefit analysis to be conducted on the SPOTprogram. This would further involve a comparison of the SPOT programwith a series of other security screening programs such as randomscreening. The SPOT strategic plan should also be revised andincorporate risk assessment information through the identification ofcosts and resources .Finally, a study should be conducted todetermine the feasibility of using airport checkpoint-surveillancesvideo recordings of all the passengers passing through thecheckpoints and were later charged for security breaches (GAO, 2013).This will enable the program to identify and understand the behaviorsexhibited by the terrorism suspects at the airports or at the pointsof surveillance.

4.2The United States House of Representatives

InNovember 2011, the U.S House of Representatives produced a “JointMajority Staff Report” with the primary aim of highlighting theachievements of the TSA’s SPOT program over the last decade.Additionally, the report provided details of factors that were deemedto affect the operations of the program. It is in this regard thatthe various findings were made (U.S House of Representatives, 2011).

Tobegin with, the report established the existence of administrativeincompetency as a result of extensive bureaucracy in the system.Here, it was established that more than 21 other agencies were housedby the Department of Homeland Security thereby diluting the statusand mission of the TSA (U.S House of Representatives, 2011). Anotherfactor that affected the performance of the TSA program was the highturnover level. The report indicated that there was a turnover ofless than five senior managers in the last decade. The long vacanciesbetween appointments were deemed to affect the ability of theestablishment to achieve its results. The TSA has more than 65,000personnel which is higher than various departments such as that oflabor, education, energy, and urban development (U.S House ofRepresentatives, 2011). In addition to this, there are 3,986employees at the headquarters in addition to the 9,656 administrativestaff on the field.

Forthe last decade, the program had seen the number of employeesincrease by an astonishing 400%. From 16,500 employees in 2001, thecurrent number stood at 65,000 (U.S House of Representatives, 2011).Despite the increase in the number of personnel, the totalenplanement within the same period had only risen by 12%. Theexisting discrepancies between an increase in the number of employeesand the corresponding rise in enplanement in the United States wereregarded as one of the primary reasons for the ineffectiveness of theprogram. Additionally, despite the fact that the program used morethan $2.4 billion to train 137,000 staff in 2002, more employees haveleft the TSA than those that have been retained over the years (U.SHouse of Representatives, 2011). Even though over the past ten yearsTSA has spent over $57 billion to secure the transportation networkin the United States, the performances have not reflected a goodreturn on the investment in the taxpayers’ contributions. Theaverage number of TSA personnel in the 457 airports is as follows 30administrative personnel of which 21 officers are in the field withthe other nine based at the headquarters (U.S House ofRepresentatives, 2011).

4.3Comparison of TSA SPOT Programs in the United States and Israel

Fromthe secondary sources utilized in this study, it was established thatthere is a substantial similarities between the TSA’s behavioraldetection mechanisms in Israel and the United States. At the sametime, the research has found out that the results achieved in eachinstance have been different over the years (Harwood, 2010). Thedifference was as a result of various factors such as the number ofairports under surveillance as well as the number of passengersthrough the airports within a particular period (Harwood, 2010).

Inthe United States, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)initiates full body scanning of passengers going through its airports(Harwood, 2010). On the other hand, Israel behaviorally profiles allthe passengers travelling in and out of its airports. Expertsacknowledge the need for United States to develop a broader profilingsystem that would focus on behavioral patterns of the passengers(Harwood, 2010). This form of a program would not primarily focus onrace, ethnicity or nationality but would ensure that more emphasis islaid on the behavioral analysis of the targets. In this regard, thelaw enforcement agencies need to incorporate intelligence. Areaswhere such information is obtainable include airlines and consular.Recent and long-term information relating to an individual’sbehaviors would be used to analyze movements and potential threats(Harwood, 2010).

Thoseadvocating for the use of behavioral profiling in place of full bodysearches argued that the latter would enable the authorities toidentify attackers with malicious intents rather than weapons theywere likely to be possessing (Harwood, 2010). An example in thisregard related to the nineteen attackers who were able to commandeerfour planes during the deadly 9/11 attacks on the United States. Theterrorists had nothing other than box cutters and bomb threats.Therefore, the most effective means of ensuring security in theaviation industry would be to prevent the terrorists from boardingthe planes (Harwood, 2010).

Themajor challenge in this case would be attributed to the fact that theTSA developed a program without verifying if it would work. The SPOTprogram had been allocated approximately $400 million withoutscientific validation (Harwood, 2010). The Government AccountabilityOffice (GAO) has however declared that United States is not in aposition to replicate the Israeli model as a result of the size ofthe American commercial aviation industry in addition to politicalconcerns. Israeli national carrier El Al is a relatively smallairline that operates between two locations, namely Ben Gurion andEilat (Harwood, 2010). On the other hand, the TSA is in charge of 467airports. In 2008, El Al recorded about 3.6 million passengers ashaving used the airline in comparison to the 128 million that used UScarrier Southwest Airlines within a similar period (Harwood, 2010).Another difference between the TSA SPOT program and the Israeli modelis that the former is conducted from a distance. Additionally, thereare no personal interactions between the passengers and the BDOofficers except in cases where secondary scanning is to be conductedon the passenger. In the case of the Israeli model, the behaviordetection officers will hunt down any potential threats andinterrogate those that arouse suspicion rather than allow suchthreats to lead to devastating effects (Harwood, 2010). This isdespite the fact that the SPOT program has never identified a singleterrorist since its inception in the United States.

4.0.Results and Discussion

Thischapter presents the findings of the study using the techniquesdescribed in the preceding chapter. After collecting all thequestionnaires, the study realized a 95% response rate and thisimpressive response rate was attributed to the administration ofquestionnaires by the research assistants who assisted respondents tounderstand questions they viewed as difficult or ambiguous.

GeneralResponses on Efficacy of TSA’s SPOT Program

Thetable below presents the responses of all the participants who weresubjected to the general and some of the most direct questionsexamining the efficacy of the SPOT program.

Table4.1: Augmented Responses on Efficacy of TSA’s SPOT Program

**mostdistinctive outcomes marked for further analysis and validitypurposes

Theresults are graphically summarized in Appendix I and indicate varyingdegrees of outcomes for each of the questions. However, a generallook at the responses reveals that the respondents, who were mostlypassengers, do not fully comprehend the operational mechanism of theprogram or simply feel the SPOT program is grossly ineffective.Concerning the necessity of the SPOT program in U.S. airports, only32% of the respondents felt that the program was necessary, anoverwhelming 64% did not see the essence of the program while 2%could not tell whether the program is necessary or not. The littleresponse obtained for those who were not sure of the programsignificance implies that a large number of passengers are aware ofthe TSA’s SPOT program. Another interesting outcome related to thisfinding concerns the question as to whether airport security iscomplete without the SPOT program. Here, 50% felt the SPOT programplayed a role in airport security while 47% felt it did not play anysignificant role with only 3% not sure if the program played anysignificant role in airport security. Taken together, the two studyoutcomes have one implication to the extent that the SPOT programought to be used as a supplementary rather than a key airportsecurity program.

Oneof the most critical outcomes to the endeavor of this paper wasrevealed by the two questions asking participants whether TSAofficers had referred them for secondary screening. To this end, only19% of the respondents confessed that they had been referred forsecondary screening. Moreover, out of the 19% who had been referredfor secondary screening, none of them was taken for advancedscreening or questioning. These outcomes have two implications forthis paper: Firstly, the SPOT program can aid in isolating a veryminimal number of passengers for secondary screening and byextension, very few or no criminals. Secondly, the program is eitherflawed or it lacks an advanced operational structure to screensuspicious passengers referred for secondary screening. Nonetheless,it can be suggested that the program fails to identify suspiciousindividuals all the same. A higher majority of respondents (79%) alsofelt that the SPOT program leads to racial/ religious discriminationof passengers by the BDOs as well as fellow passengers. Two questionsdesigned to ensure validity and obtain critical responses on whetherpassengers felt harassed by behavior detection officers providedsimilar/ consistent outcomes. Most passengers (77% and 76%) notedthat the presence of BDOs or the notion of them being screened alonemade them feel intimidated while only a few (20% and 22%) observedthat the screening process had no impact on the emotionalpredisposition and thought process. Since this question was designedto assess the efficacy of the SPOT program as a scientific mechanismof behavior detection, the outcomes provided herein portray it assubject to failure since it is likely to mistake innocent individualsfor terrorists.

Interviewswith BDOs, Administrators and Security Experts

Contraryto the general questionnaire outcomes, conducting interviews with theBDOs, TSA officers and Florida Airport administrators yieldedinvaluable insights that provided details that can be used to explainthe patterns in Table 4.1.

4.2.1.Behavioral Detection Officers (BDO’s)

Thestudy interviewed 45 BDOs, and one of the clearest outcomes is thatall of them observed that the SPOT program is necessary. However,most BDOs, especially those employed between 2003 and 2005 noted thatthe initial training they underwent was not adequate as it wasundertaken hurriedly to fill the relatively new positions that hadbeen created by the TSA. Moreover, the on-the-job training conductedby TSA failed to provide them with the skills required to detectcriminals given the ever-evolving nature of terrorism. The officersnoted that the greatest challenge they face was in using behaviordetection mechanics since some individuals may not manifest theirinternal thought processes in a physicallyobservable manner.Most BDOs (75%) agreed that TSA offers them decentremunerationbut strongly agreed that the welfare and non-salary benefits (whichthey value most) were very unattractive. The implication of thisoutcome for this paper is that TSA spending on BDOs should allocate agreater proportion to non-salary benefits of BDOs to motivate them.In Florida Airport, the BDOs observed that at any one time, therewere “more than enough” behavioral detection officers at anysingle workstation, a factor that led to duplication of work andlaziness on the part of some officers. The statement below wasobtained from one BDO.

“TheTSA hires every year while the number of workstations remain thesame. Here (Florida Airport), sometimes there is more work, sometimesthere is very little work, but everybody has to report leading tolack of accountability on the part of some officers” – Respondent

Thisimplies that there is need for the TSA to undertake restructuring inorder to relieve some officers of their duties and ultimately cut theauthority’s budget while increasing efficiency. Essentially,interviewing the BDOs reveals managerial rather than financialproblems on the part of the TSA.

4.2.2.Airport Administrators and Security Experts

Theinterview with the airport administrators at Florida Airport revealedtheir dissatisfaction with some of the BDOs deployed by TSA.According to a security expert based at the airport who wasinterviewed by this study, the key intention of having the BDOs atthe airport is to use behavioral science knowledge to discernsuspicious individuals at the airport and any action taken by theofficers ought to be consistent with that understanding. The head ofsecurity at the airport, however, noted that any assessment as towhether funding for the SPOT program was necessary out to be guidedby the fact that non-verbal behavior detection by the TSA is only oneof the many security initiatives at the airport. The followingstatement was retrieved from the interview with the airport securitychief.

“Determiningwhether TSA should cut funding for the SPOT program is a situationthat calls for a delicate balance between examining the efficiency ofthe program as a single measure and as part of the larger effortsundertaken to secure U.S. airports.”-Respondent

Muchas the experts provided cautious responses to concerning the efficacyof the program, it can be inferred from their responses that the TSAhas given undue attention to the SPOT program at the expense of manyother important airport security initiatives.

CHAPTER FIVEConclusionand Recommendations

Accordingto the questionnaire on the efficacy of the TSA’s SPOT program,various conclusions were achieved. A higher number of the respondentsindicated their belief that the program was not effective in ensuringthe security of the airports in the United States. The same trend wasobtained in response to the improvements in security that has beenmade by the United States over time. The study was specific on theimpact of the BDOs. A higher number of the respondents also felt thatnon-verbal communication had the desirable effects in the long run.This was borne of the fact that the BDO process intimated arelatively larger percentage of the passengers using the UnitedStates’ airports.

Theresponses were in stark contrast to their belief in the error-pronenature of the program. In fact, a comparison analysis indicates thatmore individuals appeared to believe that the system was susceptibleto few errors. One major disadvantage was the race factor. Based onthe responses obtained, it was evident that a substantial number ofthe responses were of the belief that the BDO officers were likely todiscriminate the passengers based on their ethnic backgrounds. Inconclusion, few individuals believed that the SPOT program was themost effective way of detecting behavioral patterns of thepassengers.

Thepaper found out that the SPOT program is grossly ineffective as ascientific mechanism of identifying criminal behavior because mostpassengers exhibit signs of nervousness and suspicion when theyrealize they are being screened. The suspicion and nervousness makesuch “innocent” passengers susceptible to the behavior detectionofficer’s criminal characteristics. Moreover, the inquiry has alsoconfirmed the findings of other studies such as Frank et al. (2009)and GAO (2013) revealing that many criminals may not exhibit theirthought processes and behavioral intentions in a physicallyobservable manner.

Ofthe respondents in the research, fewer had been referred forsecondary screening. This could be attributed to techniques utilizedby the BDOs when identifying passengers to be taken for furthertesting. To highlight the major issues that need to be addressed bythe SPOT program, no individual had been found guilty after beingsubjected to advanced screening. This is an indication that thevariables utilized by the BDO officers may be ineffective in the longrun. Moreover, the study established that the behavioral changesmight be natural once a passenger realizes that they are beingexposed to further screening. In such cases, innocent passengers arelikely to be nervous and suspicious. This in turn may send the wrongmessage to the BDO officers.

Anotherissue that featured prominently in the research related to theconducts of the BDO officers. In Florida for instance, not only werethey courteous but also friendly. Moreover, they were professionaland ethical in executing their duties. However, such responses werenot similar for other airports across the country. There had beencases of BDO officers using excessive force when approaching thepassengers. In other instances, the officials were deemed to havebeen unethical and unprofessional when handling cases. Lack ofsufficient training and remuneration were considered to be thegreatest hindrance among the BDO officers. Despite the federalgovernment having assigned millions of dollars to the project, lackof adequate training has curtailed the optimum performance of theofficers.

Onthe part of BDOs, the SPOT program as portrayed in the outcomes ofthis study reveals gross managerial incompetence rather than lack offinances on the part of the TSA. For instance, the TSA is seen to bespending too much funds in hiring BDOs, yet there is no capacitybuilding. This is highlighted by the lack of additional training oncurrent trends of security breaches. They are therefore, not equippedto effectively deal with the massive challenges that their jobsentail. Moreover, the authority spends much more money on salariesrather than welfare benefits to which BDOs attach a lot ofimportance. Security experts and airport administrators also find theSPOT program ineffective as a scientific method of behavior detectionand feel the resources allocated to the program is not justifiedgiven that it is only one of the many airport security measures.Nonetheless, the study finds it necessary to educate the public onthe significance of the SPOT program.

Thelack of an effective framework of operations is one of the challengesfacing the program. Through extensive evaluation of the outcomes, itwas established that the BDO SPOT program had failed to attain thelevels of effectiveness that were anticipated at the initial stagesof implementation. The failure of the system to lead to the actualarrest of suspects has also led to trust issues arising. Despite theidentification of the targets for advanced searches, none had givenrise to an arrest and avoided security breaches in the aviationindustry. Considering the main reason for the flagship of the TSASPOT program, there is a consensus that the system has failed.

Reports

Thereports from various agencies charged with playing an oversight roleover the performance of the TSA spot program also provides an insightinto the operation technicalities of the program. The United StatesHouse of Representatives conducted research to evaluate theperformance of the spot program since its inception. It revealed hugeshortcomings that needed to be addressed. According to its report,the spot program had failed to achieve its primary objective, and assuch, corrective measures were deemed necessary. The outcomes hadbeen necessitated by a comparison analysis between the earlierprojections and the results. The outcomes indicated that failure bythe spot program to identify threats was an indication of itsweaknesses. Going forward, it was necessary to improve the efficiencyof the program.

TheUnited States House of Representatives found various problems withthe current operational framework of the TSA SPOT program. Despitebeing composed of politicians, the committee was impartial in theexecution of its duties with regards to national security. Theoutcomes of the evaluations were therefore free from political bias.Training and capacity building were the main areas of concern for theUnited States House of Representatives. The BDO officers neededfurther training to improve their performances. With a substantialbudget approved by the relevant legislative houses, it was left tothe transport agency to ensure that the necessary strategies were putin place. However, the report provided a scathing attack on theoffice for failing to implement the appropriate policies andoperational frameworks that would guarantee effectiveness in the longrun. Going forward, more effort needed to be exerted in theoperations of the TSA SPOT program.

GAO

Asthe primary agency mandated by the government of the Unites States toaccount for all funds that have been allocated to variousdepartments, it is important for GOA to develop a standard evaluationprocedure. Over the years, the government has set aside a budgetaryallocation for the TSA Spot program. The funds are to be utilized intraining BDO officers as well as ensuring that the program isefficient. The government should improve management of resources andconduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the governmentof United States is obtaining value from the project. The GovernmentAccountability Office, therefore, established that the transportagency had failed to achieve its mandate. The additional funds at itsdisposal could have been used to enhance the skills of the BDOofficers.

Partnershipswith Israel

Fromthe findings, it is evident that the United States government needsto develop a framework that would enable the airports securitysystems to match those that have been developed by the Israeligovernment. Additionally, both nations can use their similartechniques and share information regarding threats to the aviationindustry. Sharing of information is considered as one of the majorways through which terrorism threats can be dealt with by therespective agencies. Despite the challenges that the United Statesairports and the aviation sectors face, it should enhance itsoperating systems to equate those utilized by Israel. It is importantto note that the Israeli threat-detection program has been effectiveover the years due to the fewer number of airports under surveillanceas well as the number of passengers that go through the airports atany given time. The American government should liaise with theIsraeli counterparts to tackle the massive challenges that thesecurity apparatus face on a constant basis due to changing trends interrorism.

Thestudy established that the Israeli system was efficient due to theflexibility of the scheme. This meant that the security apparatus inthe Israeli airports were aware of existing trends in aviationthreats. As such, different operational techniques were implementeddepending on the prevailing situation. It is, for this reason, thatthe desirable results were achieved. The United States, on the otherhand, utilized the same techniques when identifying potentialthreats.

Theratio between airport security staff and the passengers was minimalin Israel in comparison to the United States. Increasing the numberof officers tasked with assessing potential threats among thepassengers would ensure the effectiveness of the BDO SPOT program.

Basedon the outcomes of the study, this paper makes the following fewrecommendations.

1. Reduction of TSA spending on SPOT program in order to ensure optimization of already allocated funds. This is aimed at ensuring the economic viability of the project. It will therefore, reduce all forms of existing wastage of public funds

2. The hiring of BDOs should be stopped until the TSA restructures its personnel management strategies. To ensure effectiveness of the entire process, the government through the relevant authorities should ensure that the additional employees will be of value to the organization.

3. Massive public education and awareness to educate passengers on the significance of the SPOT program. Most of the users of the airports in the Unites States of America are ignorant of the specific provisions of the SPOT program. Extensive training will improve the knowledgeability of the general population with regards to the program.

4. Accountability of TSA to GAO for allocated expenses on SPOT program. Taking responsibility for the actions of the agencies tasked with the management o SPOT program should be one of the primary tasks of the government. This should be done with the aim of improving the effectiveness of the program in enhancing aviation safety.

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APPENDIX

I:Augmented Responses on Efficacy of TSA’s SPOT Program

iv